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Comments
THE UNCOMPENSATED APPOINTED COUNSEL SYSTEM:
A CONSTITUTIONAL AND SOCIAL TRANSGRESSION
"Pay For Lawyers: Attorneys Ask Compensation For Aid To Indigent."1 This and similar headlines are appearing in newspapers
throughout the United States as attorneys are frequently turning
to the arena they know best, the courts, in an attempt to vindicate the
injustice thrust upon them as a result of the uncompensated, appointed
counsel system. This system, antiquated as it may be, is still being
used in one form or another, in several jurisdictions2 in order to meet
the increased constitutional requirements of counsel for an accused
at the various stages of a criminal proceeding.&3
Counsel for the poor in Kentucky always have served by court
appointment and without pay. 4 Instead of making changes in its traditional assigned counsel system to meet the increased demand for
counsel, Kentucky has preferred to rely on assigning more and more
cases to the new members of the bar.5 In doing so, Kentucky not only
1 Sunday Herald-Leader (Lexington, Ky.), Nov. 22, 1970, at 79, cols. 5-8.
2 In a 1965 report for the American Bar Foundation it was pointed out that
the assigned attorney is usually paid a moderate fee for his services in 35 states,
and in four states he is paid only in capital cases, while in six states, i.e., Kentucky,
Louisiana, Missouri, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Utah, and the District of
Columbia he is not paid at all. 1 SimvEasrmN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CPXMINAL
CASES nr Ammluc~A STATE CouRTs [hereinafter cited as SimviansrErN], 16 (1965).
It was also noted that the assigned counsel system is, "still the only one used in
about 2,900 of the 3,100 counties in the United States! Id. at 15.
See generally Bird, The Representation of Indigent Criminal Defendants in
Kentucky, 53 Ky. L.J. 478 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Bird], for a description of
Kentucky's appointed counsel system.
a Gideon v. Wainwright, 327 U.S. 335 (1963), greatly expanded the need to
provide counsel in state felony cases by requiring that every indigent person
charged with a felony in the state courts be provided, if he so desires, with
counsel to represent him. Counsel is also required in other critical stages of the
litigation. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S.
128 (1967); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966). See also Ky. CONST. § 11, which provides that an accused has the right to be
heard by counsel in all criminal prosecutions; Ky. R. CnmM. P. [hereinafter cited as
R.Cr.] 3.08, which provides for counsel at the preliminary proceeding; R.Cr. 8.04,
which deals with the assignment of counsel in general; and R.Cr. 11.02, which
provides
for counsel on appeal.
4
Palmore, Counsel for the Indigent in Criminal Cases (address before the
Governor's Conference on Bail and Right to Counsel, Louisville, Ky., Jan. 23,
1965) 29 Ky. S.B.J. No. 3, at 21, 23 (May, 1965) [hereinafter cited as Palmore].
5There is no inflexible method of limiting assignments to a specific segment
of the bar, although as a practical matter the newly admitted members of the bar
receive the bulk of the assignments. Generally the judge makes his own selection
(Continued on next page)
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has placed an unfair burden on its new attorneys, but has also failed
to live up to the spirit of Gideon v. Wainwright6 in discharging its
obligation to its indigent citizens. "A disparity exists between the
representation provided indigent defendants in Kentucky and that
contemplated by the due process and equal protection clauses of the
7
federal constitution."
In addition to the increased requirements for appointed counsel
in order to satisfy an indigent accused's constitutional rights, our
country has witnessed growing concern for the right of an indigent
accused to effective assistance of counsel, which includes assistance in
additionto counsel." Since an indigent's right to assistance in addition
to counsel traditionally has not been recognized, only a few courts
have sought to provide the resources necessary to appointed counsel
to enable them to include such services as psychiatric evaluation in
defense of the indigent. 9 These decisions have generally been based
on the sixth amendment "right to counsel' and the fourteenth amendment "due process" clause.' 0 Primarily, the deficiencies in the assigned
counsel system are said to deny an indigent defendant the effective
assistance of counsel in two ways: (1) the inferior quality of interest
invested in the defense by the uncompensated, appointed counsel,
and (2) the limited resources available for preparation of the defense." However, since the purpose of this writing is to focus mainly
on the constitutional rights of the attorney as affected by the appointed
counsel system, the guaranteed rights of the indigent as affected by the
system largely will be left unexplored.
In taking a critical look at the appointed counsel system, the first
point that should be noted is the fact that an attorney actually has very
little discretion as to whether or not he will accept his appointment as
defense counsel for an indigent accused. Once he has been appointed
by the court to represent an indigent defendant, the attorney, in almost
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

but the method used may vary from a straight rotation system of selection to

selection of an attorney who happens to be present in the courtroom at the time.
Bird, supra note 2, at 511-12.
6 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 835 (1963).
7
Bird, supra note 2, at 512.
8

See generally Note, Right to Aid in Addition to Counsel for Indigent Criminal
Defendants, 47 Mn-N. L. REv. 1054 (1963).
9 See, e.g., Bush v. McCollum, 231 F. Supp. 560 (N.D. Tex. 1964) aff'd, 344
F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1965), where the federal district court held that the denial,
in a Texas state court, of an indigent defendants motion to provide funds for
psychiatric services amounted to a violation of the defendant's due process right
under the fourteenth amendment. See also Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956);
but see
Huguley v. Martin, 325 F. Supy. 489 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
10 Williams & Bost, The Assigned Counsel System: An Exercise of Servitude?
42 Miss. L.J. 32, 42 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Williams & Bost].
11 Id.at 38.
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all cases, must proceed with the defense of the indigent or risk a
contempt judgment from the appointing court. It is an accepted
general rule in most jurisdictions that a court has the right to appoint
counsel for the defense and to require his services. 12 Conceivably,
the only immediate recourse available to a dissatisfied appointed
attorney is to continue with the defense of the indigent, and at the
same time make a motion for an order directing payment of reasonable
compensation for his services. This motion, however, is almost certain
to be denied by the trial court, with little chance for success in the
appellate courts.' 3 Looking to the future, the dissatisfied attorney can
pressure his state bar association to lobby for a more equitable and
just system of providing counsel for the indigent accused.
In addition to the constitutional rights of the indigent defendant
which are contaminated by the present appointed counsel system,
there are certain rights of the appointed attorney himself which appear
to be transgressed by the system. These include the attorney's right
to "property" as guaranteed by the federal 14 and Kentucky' 3 constitutions, his right to "due process of law" and "equal protection of the
laws" as guaranteed by the federal constitution,' 6 and his right to free1
dom from "involuntary servitude" as guaranteed by the federal and
Kentucky 18 constitutions. With a long history of litigation, dissatisfied
appointed attorneys have attacked the constitutionality of the ap12 See, e.g., Schoolfield v. Darwin, 185 S.W.2d 509 (Tenn. 1945), which
affirmed a judgment of contempt against an attorney for refusing to act as defense
counsel for two defendants in a prosecution for burglary.
1 See, e.g., United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966); Dohan v. United States, 351 F.2d 671 (5th Cir.
1965); Jackson v. State, 413 P.2d 488 (Alaska 1966); Jones v. Commonwealth, 457
S.W.2d 627 (Ky. 1970); Commonwealth Dep't of Corrections v. Burke, 426 S.W.2d
449 (Ky. 1968); Jones v. Commonwealth, 411 S.W.2d 87 (Ky. 1967); Warner
v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1966).
14 U.S. CoNsT. amend. V provides: ".... nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides: "...
nor shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
15 Ky. CONST. § 242 provides: "Municipal and other corporations, and individuals invested with the privilege of taking private property for public use, shall
make just compensation for property taken, injured or destroyed....
Ky. CoNsr. § 18 provides: "... nor shall any man's property be taken or
applied to public use without the consent of his representatives, and without just
compensation being previously made to him... "
16 U.S. CONSr. amend. XIV, § 1, supra note 14.
17 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII, § 1 states: "Neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdictions."
18 Ky.CoNsr. § 25 provides: "Slavery and involuntary servitude in this state
are forbidden, except as a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted.'
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pointed counsel system through various combinations of the above
constitutional claims in an attempt to establish an additional right-the
right of an attorney, appointed by the court, to compensation by the
public. For the most part, these attempts have been unsuccessful,
with the majority of jurisdictions holding that, in the absence of a
state statute or court rule, assigned counsel for an indigent defendant

have no right to compensation by the public.' 9 Generally, the attorney's right to compensation has been denied on the basis of two
theories: (1) that it is the attorney's duty as an officer of the court to

render gratuitous service when appointed by the court, 20 to defend
an indigent accused and (2) that the obligation to render gratuitous
service is a condition of the license to practice law, and the attorney
21
consents to this condition when he applies for and accepts the license.
But at least one court has rejected the theory that an attorney, in
accepting his license, consents to render uncompensated services for
indigent defendants under court appointment. 22 Although it concluded
19 The following jurisdictions have recognized or held that, in the absence of
a statute or court rule, assigned counsel for an indigent accused have no right to
compensation by the public: the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits of the United
States Court of Appeals and the states of Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California,
Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah, Washington and West Virginia. For a listing of cases in the above jurisdictions, see 21
Annot.,
20 A.L.R.3d 822.
This is the reason most frequently used by the courts in support of their
view denying the attorney's right to compensation. See United States v. Dillon,
346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978; Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45 (1932); Jackson v. State, 413 P.2d 488 (Alaska 1966); Rowe v. Yuba
County, 17 Cal. 61 (1860); Weiner v. Fulton County, 148 S.E.2d 143 (Ga. 1966);
Jones v. Commonwealth, 411 S.W.2d 37 (Ky. 1967); Warner v. Commonwealth,
400 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1966); Williams v. Commonwealth, 110 S.W. 339 (Ky.
1908); People v. Thompson, 205 App. Div. 518, 199 N.Y.S. 868 (1923); Scott v.
State 392 S.W.2d 681 (Tenn. 1965); Presby v. Klickitat County, 31 P. 876 (Wash.
1892).
As officers of the court, attorneys are thought to have a duty when called
upon by the court to render services for indigents in criminal cases without payment of a fee except as may be provided by statute or court rule. Jackson v. State
supra at 490. "[I]t is a duty which counsel so designated owes to his profession.
...No one is at liberty to decline such an appointment...." Palmore, supra note
4, at 21.
21 See United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633 (1965), cert. denied 382 U.S.
978; Dollan v. United States 351 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1965); Jackson v. State, 413
P.2A 488 (Alaska 1966); Weiner v. Fulton County, 148 S.E.2d 143 (Ga. 1966),
cert. denied 385 U.S. 958; Johnson v. Whiteside County, 110 Ill.
22 (1884). But
see Ruckenbrod v. Mullins, 133 P.2d 325 (Utah 1943).
Under this theory when an attorney applies for and accepts a license to
practice law he is deemed to be aware of the conditions of the license and therefore
to consent to them, United States v. Dillon, supra at 635.
An applicant for admission to practice law may justly be deemed to be
aware of the traditions of the profession which he is joining, and to know
that one of these traditions is that a lawyer is an officer of the court obligated to represent indigents for little or no compensation upon court
order. Id. at 635.
22
Ruckenbrod v. Mullins, 133 P.2d 325 (Utah 1943).
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that an attorney, as an officer of the court, may be compelled to render
gratuitous services, the Supreme Court of Utah, in Ruckenbrod v. Muilins, rejected the consent theory in holding that a state cannot impose
restrictions on the acceptance of a license which will deprive the
licensee of his constitutional rights.23
Most challenges to the uncompensated, appointed counsel system
by attorneys have been based on the premise that the system amounts
to an unconstitutional taking of private property for public use without
just compensation. 24 Another argument often advanced in relation
to this is that the system takes property without due process of law
and denies equal protection of the laws. 25 Obviously, an underlying
assumption in both of these arguments is that an attorney's time and
services are considered his "property" in the constitutional sense. As
early as 1854 the Supreme Court of Indiana intimated that an
attorney's services are his "property,"2 and in 1957 the United States
Supreme Court likewise in Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners27 and
Konigsberg v. State Bar28 insinuated that the practice of law is analogous to "property" as protected by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. In Schware
the Court held that a state cannot exclude a person from taking a bar
examination in such a manner that contravenes the due process or
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, 29 and in
Konigsberg the Court held that a state cannot refuse to admit a person
to the bar for reasons which constitute a denial of due process and
equal protection of the laws, in violation of the fourteenth amend0
ment.
Nine years later, two cases were decided which applied the Schware
and Konigsberg cases to the problem of whether an attorney's services

2

31d. at 327.

24

This premise is based upon U.S. CONST. amend. V and amend. XIV, §

1,

supra note 14; there are similar provisions in many state constitutions, e.g., Ky.
CoNsT.
25 §§ 13, 242, supra note 15.
This argument is founded upon U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1, supra note 15.
28
InWebb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13 (1854), the Supreme Court of Indiana upheld
the power of a judge to employ an attorney at the expense of a county to defend a
pauper in the absence of statutory authority. By its language the court seemed to
imply that an attorney's services are his property:
To the attorney, his profession is his means of livelihood. His legal
owledge is his capital stock. His professional services are no more at the
mercy of the public, as to remuneration, than are the goods of the
merchant, or the crops of the farmer, or the wares of the mechanic. Id.
at 17.
27 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
28 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
29 Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238 (1957).
30 Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 262 (1957).
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constitute property but with different results. Jackson v. State31 suggests that Schware and Konigsberg do not stand for the fact that an
attorney's services are "property". The Supreme Court of Alaska, in
holding that an assigned attorney has no constitutional right to receive
compensation and is entitled to compensation only to the extent that
statute or court rule may so provide, said that Schware and Konigsberg
do not suggest that a lawyer is deprived of his right to practice law
without due process or has such a right taken from him without just
compensation when he is required to represent an indigent defendant
without pay.32 On the other hand, in Weiner v. Fulton County33 the
Court of Appeals of Georgia extended Schware and Konigsberg in
declaring there to be in all practical effect a taking of property by the
sovereign when an attorney is required to defend an indigent without
compensation. 34 The Georgia court relied on Schware and Konigsberg
when it said, "[T]he right to practice law has been held to be a property
right within the meaning of the due process and equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States."35
Just as it would seem that the services of a doctor, a plumber, or a
barber are his "property" within the constitutional sense of the word,
it should logically follow that the services of a lawyer constitute his
"property." For just as a grocer, a clothing store owner, and an automobile dealer sell their goods, a doctor, a plumber, a barber, and a
lawyer sell their services. It would be interesting to observe the uproar if an automobile dealer were required to give free cars to indigents
or a barber were required to give free haircuts.
The lawyer has been placed in a class by himself and forced to
give up his property, i.e., his services, for public use without adequate
compensation, without due process of law, and without equal protection
of the laws. The attorney is being deprived of his property without
due process of law in the sense that it is being taken in violation of the
federal and state constitutions simply as a result of the failure of courts
to take an affirmative stand and break away from tradition in those
jurisdictions where the legislature has failed to provide for compensation. Likewise, the attorney is deprived of equal protection of the laws
when he is compelled to perform services without compensation
while no other profession is so required to give its goods or services
free of charge. 'Itis especially ironic, in a land that cherishes its free31413 P.2d 488 (Alaska 1966).
32 Id. at 489.
33 148 S.E.2d 148 (Ga. 1966).
34 Id. at 145.
35Id.
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dom and constitutional rights, that the very person who is charged
with the protection and perpetuation of those rights is most flagrantly
deprived of his own rights."36
A less frequently used argument for attacking the present uncompensated assigned counsel system is that the present system violates
the federal and state constitutional prohibitions against involuntary
servitudeY7 Incorporated in the involuntary servitude argument is the
contention that the present system also violates the federal prohibition
of peonage38 Peonage has been defined as a "condition of enforced
servitude by which the servitor is compelled to labor in liquidation of
some debt or obligation, either real or pretended, against his will." 9
Since it has been held that peonage was comprehended within the
slavery and involuntary servitude proscribed by the thirteenth amendment,40 the two arguments are necessarily compatible. Although the
involuntary servitude argument has found almost no sympathy in the
courts, 41 it apparently is not because the argument itself lacks merit.
The failure to give weight to the argument seemingly is because of the
courts' fear to depart from the traditional concept of thinking of the
attorney as an officer of the court, obligated to render gratuitous service,
and because of the courts' fear of budgetary complications if an order
were promulgated which required assigned attorneys to be compensated. 42 In spite of the fact that many courts recognize the serious
burden which the present system places on the bar, they prefer to
maintain the status quo and wait for the legislature to act.48 An attor86
Hunter, Slave Labor in the Courts-A Suggested Solution, 74 CASE & CoM.
July-Aug., 3,10 (1969).
81 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1, supranote 17, for the federal prohibition

against slave labor, and Ky. CONST. § 25, supra note 18, for a typical state pro-

hibition.
8842 U.S.C. § 1994 (1970) states:
The holding of any person to service or labor under the system known
as peonage is abolished and forever prohibited in any territory or state
of the United States; and all acts, laws, resolutions, orders, regulations,
or usages of any Territory or State, which have heretofore established,

maintained, or enforced, or by virtue of which any attempt shall hereafter be made to establish, maintain, or enforce, directly or indirectly,
the voluntary or involuntary service or labor of any persons as peons, in
liquidation of any debt or obligation or otherwise, are declared null and

void.
89

LEGISLATrVE REFERENCE SERvIcE, LBRARY or CONGRESS, TAE CoNsrrruCA, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 1062
TION OF THE UNrrED STATES OF AE

(1964).
40
41

Slaughter-Iouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
See, e.g., United States v. Dillon, 846 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,

382 U.S. 978 (1966); State v. Rush, 217 A.2d 441 (N.J. 1955).
42 See Warner v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1966).

4
3 See, e.g., Jones v. Commonwealth, 457 S.W.2d 627 (Ky. 1970); Commonwealth, Dep't of Corrections v. Burke, 426 S.W.2d 449 (Ky. 1968); Jones v. Commonwealth, 411 S.W.2d 87 (Ky. 1967); Warner v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.2d

209 (Ky. 1966).
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ney assigned to defend an indigent accused is being compelled to
render the gratuitous service by the threat of a contempt judgment.
If an attorney refuses the appointment he risks a possible flne, imprisonment, and loss of his livelihood. This form of coercion plus the fact
that many attorneys perform these services unwillingly results in nothing less than involuntary servitude. The fact that attorneys are being
forced to perform these gratuitous services because of an obligation
which they are said to owe to the court amounts to "peonage."44
Ironically, what emerges is a form of court-sanctioned servitude which
is in violation of the very constitutions which the courts are sworn to
uphold.
Historically, the courts in most jurisdictions have not been receptive to the constitutional arguments applicable to the assigned attorney.
In United States v. Dillon,45 an attorney appointed by a federal district
court to represent an indigent defendant in a post-conviction proceeding
filed a claim for compensation at the court's invitation. Since the appointment and service were prior to the enactment of the Criminal
Justice Act of 1964, 46 the district court held that the appointment constituted a taking of the lawyer's property for public use, and therefore
reasonable compensation was payable. The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that the court order appointing and directing
counsel to represent an indigent defendant did not amount to a taking
of the attorney's property which would require just compensation under
47
the fifth amendment.
Although the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Warren v. Commonwealth4" recognized that there was merit in the proposition that assigned counsel should be compensated, it skirted the constitutional
issue of whether a court order requiring an attorney to represent an
indigent defendant constitutes a taking of the attorney's property
within the context of the fifth amendment. 49 Instead, the Kentucky
Court chose to rely on the traditional notion of the attorney as an
officer of the court and affirmed a lower court order overruling an
assigned attorney's motion for allowance of a fee. The court indicated
that the time for compelling the public treasury to make compensation

44

See 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (1970), supra note 38.
45 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966).
46 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1970). This act provides for compensation by the
federal
4 7 government to assigned counsel representing indigents in the federal courts.
United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 636 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 978 (1966).
48400 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1966).
49 U.S. CoNsT. amend. V provides for "Just compensation" whenever private
property is taken for public use. See note 14 supra.
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available was not appropriate and thus deferred to legislative actionP
The decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Rush5 '
represents what is perhaps the turning point in the courts' theretofore
unwillingness to relieve attorneys of the increased burden of the
appointed counsel system. Although it disposed of all constitutional
arguments as they affect an attorney,52 the court decided that relief,
in the form of compensation, should be ordered. Since it possessed
the power to control the practice of law before it, the New Jersey court
concluded that it also had the power to order compensation for those
officers of the court whose performance was necessary for the proper
functioning of the system. The court found authority for the payment
in a state statute which required the county treasurer to pay the
necessary expenses of the prosecutor. The court further concluded
that the expense of providing an indigent defendant with counsel,
without which the prosecution would fail, must be included as a
necessary expense of the prosecutor. The court decided, however,
that it would delay ordering payment until the legislature had reasonable opportunity to determine how the obligation was to be met. The
same year the Court of Appeals of Georgia, on the other hand, held
that although taking an attorney's time and expenses by appointment
to represent an indigent accused constituted taking of private property
53
for a public purpose, such taking was not compensable.
Again in 1970 the Kentucky Court of Appeals chose to follow the
precedent set by Warner54 and two other cases 55 and continued to
defer to legislative action. 56 In reaching its decision not to order compensation, the Kentucky Court reasoned that a judicial order for payment would present difficulties because of the lack of a standard for
determining reasonable compensation and because of the lack of a
system for payment. The Court did recognize, however, that "the
burden of the legal profession is continuing to increase, and to some
50400 S.W.2d 209, 212 (Ky. 1966). See also Jones v. Commonwealth, 457
S.W.2d 627 (Ky. 1970); Commonwealth, Dep't of Corrections v. Burke, 426
S.W.2d 449 (Ky. 1968); Jones v. Commonwealth, 411 S.W.2d 37 (Ky. 1967).
51217 A.2d 441 (N.J. 1966).
52
The constitutional claims advanced by appellant in his own behalf were that
an assignment without compensation for services takes private property for public
use without just compensation, U.S. CoNsr. amends. V & XIV; takes property
without due process of law and denies equal protection of the law, U.S. CONSr.
amend. XIV; and constitutes involuntary servitude, U.S. CONST. amend, XIII. State
v. Rush, 217 A.2d 441, 445 (N.J. 1966). Appellant also advanced the claim that
the assignment constituted peonage which is prohibited by federal law, 42 U.S.C. §
1994 5(1970),
but the court likewise held this to be without merit. Id. at 446.
3
Weiner v. Fulton County, 148 S.E.2d 143 (Ga. 1966).
54,400 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1966).

55 Commonwealth, Dep't. of Corrections v. Burke, 426 S.W.2d 449 (Ky.
1968);
56 Jones v. Commonwealth, 411 S.W.2d 87 (Ky. 1967).
Jones v. Commonwealth, 457 S.W.2d 627 (Ky. 1970).
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of those members of the profession who are being called upon to bear
be amounting to a taking of
the brunt of the load it may actually
57
property without compensation."

Thus a history of cases emerges which, in all but approximately
four jurisdictions, 8 demonstrates a refusal to grant relief from the
increasing burden on the legal profession. Although a majority of the
courts may be sympathetic to the hardship imposed by this uncompensated, appointed counsel system, they refuse to break from tradition and order some type of payment. The decision in Jackson v. State59
appears to be indicative of the general rule that an attorney appointed
to represent an indigent defendant in a criminal matter has no constitutional right to receive compensation for his services in the absence
of statute or court rule. "[A]lthough the majority view thus places the
burden upon the members of the bar, no one suggests they may not
constitutionally be relieved of it. Indeed the vast majority of the state
legislatures have provided for some compensation for assigned counsel
•."o and Congress itself has provided for compensation with passage
of the Criminal Justice Act of 1964.61
In the minority are at least four jurisdictions; Indiana,6 2 Iowa,63
New Jersey,6 4 and Wisconsin, 65 which have held or recognized that
courts have the power to relieve lawyers assigned to represent indigents
of the burden of rendering free services, even though no statute or
court rule provides for compensation. It should be noted that other
jurisdictions have also provided for compensation, but in doing so the
courts have relied on statutory interpretation.66
In the early case of Webb v. Baird67 the Supreme Court of Indiana
relied on a provision of the state constitution 68 in deciding that appointed counsel have a non-statutory right to compensation. The court
went on to say:
Id. at 631.
58 Indiana, Iowa, New Jersey and Wisconsin. See notes 62-65 infra.
57

59 413 P.2d 488 (Alaska 1966).
60 State v. Rush, 217 A.2d 441, 444 (N.J. 1966).
6118
62

U.S.C. § 3006A (1970).
See State ex rel. Grecco v. Allen Circuit Court, 153 N.E. 914 (Ind. 1958);
Knox County Council v. State, 29 N.E.2d 405 (Ind. 1940); Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind.

13 (1854);
Blythe v. State, 4 Ind. 525 (1853).
63 See Ferguson
v. Pattawattamie County, 278 N.W. 223 (Iowa 1938); Hall
v. Washington County, 2 Greene 473 (Iowa 1850).
64 See State v. Rush, 217 A.2d 441 (NJ. 1966); State v. Horton, 170 A.2d 1
(N.J. 61961).
5 See Dave County v. Smith, 13 Wis. 585 (1861); Carpenter v. Dave County,
9 Wis. 274 (1859).
66 See, e.g., Aboderly v. County of Worcester, 227 N.E.2d 486 (Mass. 1967).
676 Ind. 13 (1854).
68 IND. CONST. art. 1, § 21, provides that "no man s particular services shall be
demanded without just compensation."
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The law which requires gratuitous services from a particular class,
in effect imposes a tax to that extent upon such class-clearly in
violation of the fundamental law which provides for a uniform
and equal rate of assessment and taxation upon all the citizens.6 9
Approximately 85 years later in a 1940 case, 7° the Supreme Court of
Indiana interpreted the same constitutional provision 7 ' again and held
that the state had no right to assign counsel without payment. In so
holding the court relied on the seemingly universal rule that "a court
has the inherent power and authority to incur and order paid all such
expenses as are necessary for the holding of court and the administration of its duties." 72 The Supreme Court of Iowa in Hall v. Washington
County,73 concluded that an appointed attorney was entitled to compensation under the principles of the fifth amendment. 74 In holding
that a county was liable for compensating an assigned attorney, the
Iowa court pointed out that "[I]t is a fundamental rule of right, established by the Constitution of the United States, 'that private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."' 75 Likewise, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in the case of Dane County v.
Smith76 relied on the fifth amendment principle of just compensation
in holding that the power and duty to compensate appointed counsel
arises out of the power to appoint.?7 As has been noted, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey in State v. Rush7" derived its power to order
compensation from its power to control the practice of law before it,
although it did rely on a statute as authority for the payment.
Adopting the reasoning of the Rush decision, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts in Abodeely v. County of Worcester,79 extended
a state statute, which authorized courts to order payment of expenses
incident to their sittings out of county treasuries, to cover also the costs
of appointed defense counsel. The court reasoned that if it were to
provide proper prosecution, then it must also provide appropriate
defense, and therefore concluded that court-assigned counsel for indigent defendants should be paid from the county treasury.80
Thus, a minority of courts, while casting aside the shackles of
Ind. 13,17 (1854).
Knox County Council v. State ex tel. McCormick, 29 NE.2d 405 (Ind.

69 6

70

1940).
71

IND. CONST. art. 1, § 21, supra note 68.
7229 N.E.2d 405, 413 (Ind. 1940).
73 2 Greene 473 (Iowa 1850).

74 U.S. CONST. amend. V, supra note 14.
75 2 Greene 473, 478 (Iowa 1850).

76 County of Dane v. Smith, 18 Wis. 654 (1861).

77 Id. at 658.
78 217 A.2d 441 (N.J. 1966).
79 227 N.E.2d 486 (Mass. 1967).
8o Id.at 489.

1972,]

CoMnMTs

tradition, have secured the right of an appointed attorney to be
compensated for his services. These courts, for a variety of reasons,
have recognized the inequitable nature of an antiquated, assigned
counsel system which singles out one profession in our society and
forces that profession to give up its "property" without just compensation. The indigent defense system as it stands, denying compensation
to appointed attorneys, forces a limited class of citizens to bear burdens,
which in all fairness, should be borne by the public as a whole. The
increasing demand for counsel at the various stages of a criminal
proceeding have caused the burden placed on the legal profession to
become intolerable by requiring it to meet these demands with
gratuitous services. Not only is this burden unfair and unjust, but
it is basically unconstitutional both to the attorney and to the indigent.
"The lawyer himself should not fear indigency while defending the
indigent. This unfairness to the accused and hardship on the Bar are
intolerable. They are not at all conducive to the effective administration of justice.""'
Just as the uncompensated, appointed counsel system deprives the
attorney of his property without just compensation, without due
process, and without equal protection of the laws, it also deprives the
indigent defendant of effective assistance of counsel. 2 Not only is the
attorney forced by the sovereign to render his services in payment
of an obligation which he is said to owe to the state, but the indigent
defendant likewise is forced to accept something less then effective
assistance of counsel. In all probability, an attorney who is forced to
render free legal services to an indigent defendant will not devote
as much time and effort to that defendant's case as he will to the case
of a paying client. Furthermore, an attorney may resent the fact that
he is forced, under threat of contempt, to represent an indigent accused without compensation. This resentment may adversely affect
the quality of the legal representation which the defendant receives.
Therefore, the uncompensated, appointed counsel system, in all likelihood, serves to deny the indigent accused effective assistance of
counsel as guaranteed by the United States Constitution. 83
81

Ervin, Uncompensated Counsel: They Do Not Meet the ConstitutionalMandate,8249 A.B.A.J. 435, 436 (1968).
The right to "effective assistance of counser' is now generally recognized as
a constitutional requirement of due process in accordance with the sixth amendment right to counsel and the due process provisions of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. See generally Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955); Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Neufleld v. United States, 118 F.2d 875 (D.C.,
Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 815 U.S. 798 (1942); Jones v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 97 F.2d 335 (6th Cir. 1938).
83 See note 82. id.
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The costs of the uncompensated appointed counsel system should
not be overlooked. The actual economic costs of the present system
arise largely as a result of forcing attorneys to provide services without
compensation. Attorneys are just like other citizens in that they must
make a living. Thus, if a lawyer must provide free service to indigents,
his fees for his paying clients will no doubt be adjusted upward in
order to minimize his loss. The end result is that the citizens who
find it necessary to purchase legal services are actually paying part
of the costs of the appointed counsel system. Likewise, those citizens
who could barely afford legal services in the first place are now precluded from seeking such services as a result of the increased cost.
Also resulting from the uncompensated, appointed counsel system is
the cost of extra litigation which arises from dissatisfaction with the
present system. The indigent defendant may feel that he has not been
afforded effective assistance of counsel and, consequently, may appeal
the decision on that ground. It is not uncommon to find a young,
inexperienced attorney8 4 serving as court-appointed counsel for an
indigent defendant, while the prosecutor is a seasoned veteran. Needless to say, this does not encourage the defendant to believe that he
has received a fair trial. On the other hand, the appointed attorney
may not be satisfied with working without pay and may appeal the
denial of his motion for compensation. The result is more litigation to
further crowd an already over-crowded court docket.
The social costs of the present system should also be considered.
An indigent defendant, already stripped of his dignity by society, cannot be expected to feel that justice has been administered when his
newly licensed, court-appointed, uncompensated attorney attempts to
persuade him to plead guilty because the attorney doesn't want to
bear the cost of a full trial. And surely the indigent defendant cannot
be expected to feel that justice has prevailed when he is denied
assistance in addition to counsel simply because there are no funds
with which to pay for the additional assistance. Here is a member of
society who feels that he has been wronged. He does not believe
that justice can be attained in the courts, and as a result he will not
respect the laws. He probably will become an habitual offender. Likewise, the lawyer who is forced to represent an indigent without pay
cannot really be expected to feel that justice is at work. Where are
the protections which the constitution is supposed to afford against
taking property without just compensation, without due process, and
84 A 1965 report showed that in roughly one-fourth of the counties surveyed

which used the assigned counsel system exclusively, appointments were concentrated among the younger members of the bar. Sr.vmisrmx, supranote 2, at 16.
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without equal protection of the laws? Where is the protection against
involuntary servitude? And this is the very constitution which the
lawyer is expected to uphold. But maybe this is good in that it may
tend to radicalize the lawyer to the extent that he will work fervishly
for change. As has been said in a recent article dealing with this
problem, 'Itmay well be that the indirect cost of our failure to adequately compensate assigned counsel and to provide funds for the
preparation of a defense outweigh the actual monetary cost of furnishing such assistance."8 5
Kentucky, until recently, has been one of a small number of states
which do not provide for compensating court appointed attorneys in
some manner.8 6 In retaining its antique system of providing counsel for
indigent defendants, Kentucky has failed to keep pace with the changing concept as to the character of legal aid. Historically, legal aid has
been viewed as a charity to be handed out in criminal cases somewhat at
the discretion of the courts. Attorneys, as officers of the court, were said
to owe a charitable obligation to the recipients of their gratuitous services and an affirmative duty to the court to carry out their appointment.
The traditional notion has gradually given way to the concept that
legal aid is a politicaland social right s" Just as one has a right to free
speech, he also has a right to counsel in criminal proceedings. Included in this new concept is the supposition that those criminal
defendants who need legal aid should receive it and those attorneys
who provide legal aid should be compensated for their services. Since
legal aid is considered a social right, it is the responsibility of society
as a whole to bear the burden of providing it. There is no logical
reason why a single class of citizens should have to bear the expense
of meeting society's responsibility. Providing medical care, food, and
shelter are responsibilities rightfully imposed on the community as a
whole, and the people who furnish these necessities, therefore, are
compensated by the state. It is submitted that legal aid, i.e., counsel
and legal assistance in addition to counsel, in criminal proceedings is
also a necessity and should be provided and paid for by the state.
Obviously lawyers should provide the legal service, but they should
be compensated for their efforts. Attorneys should not have to carry
the community's burden, but should pay their fair share of the burden
through their tax dollars just like every other tax-paying citizen of the
community.
8

5Williams &Bost,supra note 10, at 34.

86 In 1965 those states which provided no compensation for assigned counsel
were as follows: Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, South Carolina, Tennessee and

Utah.8 7 SiLvERsTENm, supra note 2, at 253-67.
Pollock, Equal justice in Practice, 45 M=mr. L. R-v. 737, 744 (1961).
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As improvements over the present uncompensated, assigned counsel system, four alternatives have been suggested: (1) payment of
assigned counsel, (2) a public defender system, (3) a voluntary defender system, and (4) a public-private defender system.8 8 The first
alternative, payment of assigned counsel, involves the creation of
statutory provisions for compensating court-appointed counsel.89 In
order for this method to be effective, a proper means of selecting attorneys to defend indigents must be installed whereby the younger
members of the bar are not relied upon more than other members.
In addition, the pay for defending indigents must be reasonably
adequate so to eliminate resentment at having been appointed. The
second alternative, a public defender system, entails hiring public
defenders and assistant public defenders as salaried employees of the
state and counties to represent those defendants who qualify as
indigents.9 0 This system can provide effective representation only if
the compensation is reasonably adequate so as to attract competent
attorneys to serve as defenders. A voluntary defender system, the
third alternative, is not supported by state or local government, but
is a charitable organization with local control. 91 This system is
effective only if supported by adequate funds. The fourth alternative,
a public-private defender system, involves private control but governmental funding.9 2 This system is a combination of the public
defender and voluntary defender systems and, like the others, could
function effectively with adequate funding and competent personnel.
Considering the alternatives to the uncompensated, appointed
counsel system, the public defender system appears to be the preference most able to deliver efficient, effective representation for the
indigent accused. The principal obstacle, proper funding, can be
overcome under this system by alloting an adequate portion of the
state and local budgets for the public defender offices, just as is done
for the other branches of the legal system, i.e., the police, the prosecutor, the judiciary, and the corrections system. Just as the state9 3
employs judges, prosecutors, and court stenographers, the state can
also employ defense counsel in order to maintain a complete and
equitable judicial system which administers equal justice to all, regard88
Grove, Gideon's Trumpet: Taps for an Antiquated System? A Proposalfor
Kentucky, 54 Ky.L.J. 527, 544-52 (1966).

89 Id. at 544.

90 Id. at 548.
91 Id. at 551.

92 Id. at 552.

93 This word is used to indicate a political organization representing a form
of civil government. It refers to all levels of government-city, county, state and
federal.
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less of their economic status. The adversarial proceeding, which is
contemplated by Anglo-American jurisprudence, with each party
adequately and equally equipped to oppose one another is merely a
myth if the defendant is disadvantaged by court-appointed counsel.
Hopefully, a public defender system will attract defense oriented
attorneys with an interest in criminal law and procedure who want to
defend indigents and who are equally as capable as prosecution
attorneys. Also, the concept of equal justice is nothing more than a
myth if the indigent defendant is not given the same opportunity for
a defense as the wealthy defendant who is able to pay for counsel of
his choosing. "[U]se of the public defender system would do much
to minimize the inequities which continue to exist between those who
can and those who cannot afford adequate defense counsel." 94 In comparison with Kentucky's present system, the public defender system
would provide better prepared and more competent representation
for indigents. There would be additional time and proper facilities
for investigation, and defense counsel, as a rule, would be more
experienced and better equipped to meet the prosecution. Besides
being less of a financial burden on attorneys, the defender system
would be "accompanied by a distinct saving of time and money." 95
In searching for reasons why Kentucky has failed to alleviate the
undesirable derivations of the uncompensated, appointed counsel
system for so many years, one must consider the perplexing reasons
why up until now both the legislature and the courts have failed to
provide for an alternative system. Generally, the courts have recognized the problem but have deferred to the legislature on the grounds
that this is a legislative problem and that the courts cannot order
compensation unless the legislature provides the funds. On the other
hand, the legislature, in keeping with the best of its sectarian tradition,
has demonstrated a tenacious reluctance to revise Kentucky's antiquated system for defending indigents until recently. This is difficult
to comprehend since many of Kentucky's legislators are attorneys
themselves. But at last relief appears to be in sight. The 1970 Kentucky General Assembly passed a bill96 which would have provided
for a defender system in Kentucky, but the bill was amended to cover
only cities of the first class 97 and, after passing both Houses, it was
vetoed by Kentucky's Governor. Three bills9 8 of a similar nature were
94 Cuff, Public Defender System: The Los Angeles Story, 45 MINN. L. B. 715,
722 (1961).
05 Bird, supra note 2, at 521.
90 S.B. 261, 1970 Kentucky General Assembly.
97 Louisville.
98 S.B. 33, H.B. 198, H.B. 461, 1972 Kentucky General Assembly.
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introduced in the 1972 Kentucky General Assembly. The surviving bill,
House Bill 461, provides for the creation of an office of a Public
Defender as an independent state agency and requires counties with a
judicial district containing ten or more circuit judges to establish an
office of District Public Defender. Circuit court districts with fewer
than ten circuit judges are permitted to create an office of District
Public Defender under the bill.9 9 More importantly, House Bill 461
requires that attorneys, who are assigned to represent indigent
defendants in those circuit court districts with fewer than ten circuit
judges which chose to retain the appointed-counsel method of providing defense attorneys for indigent accused, must be compensated
by the county.10° As of this writing, House Bill 461 has passed both
Houses of the Kentucky General Assembly and has been signed by the
Governor. Hopefully, this act will provide adequate relief for Kentucky's attorneys and indigent defendants who are presently being
deprived of their constitutional and social rights by Kentucky's outdated, court-appointed counsel system. All Kentuckians, not only
attorneys and indigent defendants, are presently bearing the social
and economic costs of the antiquated, uncompensated, appointed
counsel system, and all Kentuckians are presently affected by the
social ills which this system has created. Conceivably, a form of
palliation has been offered in House Bill 461.
Bill Deatherage

99
Legislative Record Official Summary of Action by the Kentucky General
Assembly (Frankfort, Ky.), March 30, 1972, at 92, col. 1.
Essentially, H.B. 461 provides that Jefferson County must establish an Office
of District Public Defender, and all other counties in Kentucky may either establish
an Office of District Public Defender in their respective judicial districts or may
provide for representation of indigent defendants in some other acceptable manner.
100 House Bill 461, 1972 Kentucky General Assembly.

